Run a reachable BigCoin node
Why it matters
A node with default settings makes outbound connections and accepts none. What such a node cannot do is accept anybody else — and a new wallet can only reach nodes that listen. More reachable nodes make the network easier to join and harder to interrupt, which makes this the most useful thing a participant can add that is not hashrate.
There are three ways to be reachable. They differ mainly in what they publish about you.
| Want to help, address stays private | Tor — you get an .onion address and your IP is never published. This is what this project's own node runs, and the steps below are that setup |
|---|---|
| Have IPv6, address may be public | a firewall rule for TCP 8338 |
| IPv4 only, not behind carrier NAT | forward TCP 8338 |
| Not sure | do nothing. Mining works either way |
Read this before you open anything
A node that accepts no connections still gives its IP address to every peer it dials out to. Not listening is not anonymity.
If you listen on IPv4 or IPv6, your address is passed around the network in ADDR messages, kept in the address database of every node that hears it, and collected by anyone crawling the network. Treat it as public and permanent.
The address you mine to is in the chain forever. If the same line also runs a listening node, the two can be set side by side. A faucet payout works the same way: it is a permanent public link between the address you gave the faucet and everything that address later touches.
Port 8337 is the RPC port. Never forward it, and never bind it to anything but localhost. The RPC cookie sits in your data directory, and a wallet with no passphrase can be emptied by anyone who reaches that port. The only port that is ever forwarded is 8338.
The machines behind this site are not exempt. This explorer and the faucet are plain HTTP, so they see your IP address the way any website does. The onion address below is a node, not a web server.
Where the config file lives
| mine-bigcoin.cmd / .sh | data\bitcoin.conf, next to the script. The scripts write it once and never rewrite it, so lines you add there survive |
|---|---|
| bitcoind / bigcoin-qt with -datadir | bitcoin.conf in that folder |
| bitcoind / bigcoin-qt on Linux | ~/.bitcoin/bitcoin.conf |
If you started bigcoin-qt by double-clicking it and gave it no -datadir, it is using a default folder in your user profile, and the program will tell you which: Help → Node window → Information, the line labelled Datadir. That folder is named Bitcoin rather than BigCoin, because the fork inherits the path from Bitcoin Core unchanged — so if you also run Bitcoin Core on the same machine, give BigCoin its own -datadir, or the two will try to share one folder and one config file. Restart the node after editing.
Tor on Windows — step by step
You get an .onion address, inbound connections, and no IP address published to the network. The node builds the hidden service itself over Tor's control port, so there is nothing BigCoin-specific to put in Tor's config and no HiddenServiceDir line.
1. Install the Tor Expert Bundle, not Tor Browser. Tor Browser listens on 9150 and opens no control port, so the node cannot ask it for a hidden service. Get the Expert Bundle from the Tor Project and unpack it somewhere of its own, for example C:\tor.
2. Write a torrc. Put this in C:\tor\torrc and adjust the paths:
SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9050 ControlPort 127.0.0.1:9051 CookieAuthentication 1 DataDirectory C:\tor\tordata GeoIPFile C:\tor\data\geoip GeoIPv6File C:\tor\data\geoip6 Log notice file C:\tor\tor.log DormantTimeoutEnabled 0 DormantCanceledByStartup 1 ExitRelay 0 AvoidDiskWrites 1
| CookieAuthentication 1 | tor writes a 32-byte secret into its DataDirectory and tells the node where it is; the node reads it automatically. Preferred over HashedControlPassword because it puts no secret in any config file |
|---|---|
| DormantTimeoutEnabled 0 | Do not skip this one. Tor can idle itself out after a period with no client activity, and a dormant tor stops publishing the onion descriptor — which silently makes your node unreachable again, with nothing in the node's own log to say so |
| ExitRelay 0, no ORPort | this instance is a Tor client plus an onion service. It is not a relay and not an exit, so it never carries anybody else's traffic |
Start it with tor.exe -f C:\tor\torrc and watch tor.log until it reports Bootstrapped 100%.
3. Add these lines to bitcoin.conf and restart the node:
listen=1 bind=127.0.0.1:8338 discover=0 proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 listenonion=1 torcontrol=127.0.0.1:9051 natpmp=0 addnode=rjxywola2kupk4rp67qzidqiuxwvr76xmri5zimt6ecrvhx4xv5t7wyd.onion:8338
listenonion and torcontrol are already at these values by default, so you can leave them out; they are written here because a setting you can see is a setting you can check.
| listen=1 | Do not set listen=0 in order to "only use Tor". It is the most natural-looking mistake on this page and it switches the hidden service off with everything else: the node refuses listenonion=1 when listening is off, and also quietly turns listenonion off by itself. The way to be reachable over Tor only is the next line, not this one |
|---|---|
| bind=127.0.0.1:8338 | this is what makes it an onion-only listener. Without it, listen=1 also binds the P2P port on 0.0.0.0 and ::, so the port is open to your LAN and to your public IPv6 address as well. Tor still reaches the node because tor runs on the same machine. Useful side effect: with no bind line the onion service points at a second loopback socket on 8339; with it, there is one P2P socket and 8339 disappears |
| discover=0 | at its default the node enumerates this machine's routable addresses, registers them as local, and hands one to every peer in an ADDR self-announcement — which would publish exactly what Tor is there to hide. The onion is registered differently and survives this, so it ends up being the only address the node advertises |
| proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 | -proxy applies to every network, not just onion, so outbound IPv4 and IPv6 connections go through Tor as well and no peer sees your address at all. This is the right default for most people and it is what the release post recommends |
| natpmp=0 | nothing to map. Inbound arrives over the onion service, not a forwarded port |
onlynet=onion is the strict version: no clearnet peers at all. Until more onion nodes exist that leaves you with very few peers, and a node with one or two peers only sees what they choose to show it.
4. Check it actually worked.
bigcoin-cli getnetworkinfo -> localaddresses contains ...onion:8338 bigcoin-cli getpeerinfo -> "network": "onion", and later "inbound": true debug.log -> a single line: Bound to 127.0.0.1:8338
Do not read getnetworkinfo's reachable flags as a check on any of this. They report whether the node is willing to use a network, which only -onlynet changes; they say nothing about whether anything got through from outside. An actual inbound peer is the only proof. Give it an hour or so — inbound connections arrive when other nodes get round to your address.
5. Keep both running. The onion exists only while tor and the node are both up. On Windows the simple arrangement is two Task Scheduler tasks: start at logon, plus a repeating check every few minutes that starts whatever is not running. A normal Windows restart or shut down is safe for the node — Windows sends a console shutdown event and the node's handler takes the same path as the stop command, which takes about a second. Task Manager's End task and a power cut send no such signal, and those are the ones that can cost you a reindex.
Your onion key is your node's identity. It is written to onion_v3_private_key in the node's data directory. Delete it and you get a new address; give it to someone else and they can be your node. Keep it out of any backup you share.
Tor on Linux
The same five settings are usually already in /etc/tor/torrc, commented out. Uncomment them and add the two group-readable lines:
SocksPort 9050 ControlPort 9051 CookieAuthentication 1 CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 DataDirectoryGroupReadable 1
Then restart Tor and put your own user in Tor's group so the node can read the control cookie:
sudo systemctl restart tor sudo usermod -aG debian-tor YOUR_USER
Log out and back in for the group change to take effect. The bitcoin.conf lines are identical to the Windows ones above.
When Tor will not start
| Bootstrap stops at a low percentage, log says Received a bad CERTS cell: Link certificate does not match TLS certificate |
something between tor and the relay is terminating and re-signing TLS, so the certificate in the handshake cannot match the one the relay actually served. The usual cause is a security product with HTTPS or "encrypted traffic" scanning turned on, and it can apply to every port, not just 443 — so moving to another relay port does not help. The fix that does work is a pluggable transport: obfs4 traffic looks like random bytes, so there is no TLS session to intercept. Request bridges from the Tor Project. Transports designed to look like HTTPS are the wrong choice here, because looking like HTTPS is exactly what gets intercepted |
|---|---|
| Permission denied on the control cookie (Linux) | the two GroupReadable lines are missing, or your user is not in debian-tor yet, or you have not logged out and back in since adding it |
| Onion address appears, but no inbound peer | normal for the first hour or more. Other nodes have to learn the address first. Start the node with -debug=tor if you want to watch the service being registered |
IPv6
If your ISP gives you IPv6, this is the least work of the three: there is no port mapping to set up, only a firewall rule to add. The node already listens on :: port 8338.
In the router, allow inbound TCP 8338 to that one machine's IPv6 address — not the whole prefix, and not 8337. On Windows, let bitcoind or bigcoin-qt through Windows Firewall as well; the prompt on first run does this. The address then appears under localaddresses in getnetworkinfo once a peer confirms it. Do not set discover=0 in this case — here you want the node to advertise.
The privacy cost is specific: an IPv6 address carries your prefix, which identifies your line, and the address you open has to be a stable one to be useful — so what gets published is a stable identifier for your connection rather than a temporary one. An IPv4 address shared behind carrier NAT is vaguer than that.
IPv4 port forward
Give the machine a fixed LAN address first (a DHCP reservation), then forward TCP 8338 to it. Without the reservation the rule ends up pointing at a different machine after a reboot. Let bitcoind or bigcoin-qt through the local firewall too.
If the WAN address shown in your router is inside 100.64.0.0/10, or simply does not match what a "what is my IP" page tells you, you are behind carrier NAT and no amount of forwarding will work. Use Tor instead.
upnp=1 and natpmp=1 ask the router to open the port for you. Both are off by default, and both are a request to a device that will then be forwarding a port on your behalf: set them deliberately or leave them alone.
Offer your node as a built-in seed
From v1.9 a seed node is compiled into the binaries, so a node with no config file still finds peers on its first start. There is one address in that list today. That is not a technical limit — the list takes as many entries as it is given, and nothing in the software has to change to add one.
If you run a reachable node and want it in the next release, say so in the ANN thread. What is needed:
| Actually reachable | proven by an inbound peer in getpeerinfo, not by a config flag |
|---|---|
| Stable address | you expect it to answer on the same address for months. An onion address is stable by construction, which is one more reason to prefer it |
| Any of the three | onion, IPv6 or IPv4 are all usable. An onion address publishes nothing about your line — it is the node's identity, not your connection's |
| You accept it is permanent | a seed address is compiled into released binaries and cannot be recalled from copies already downloaded. Think about that before offering an IP address rather than an onion |
Built-in seeds matter only on a node's first start, when its address book is empty; after that the node learns peers from the network and never consults the list again. That is exactly why the list needs more than one entry: the first minute of a newcomer's first run is the part nobody can route around.
No list of reachable nodes is published here, and there is no ranking. If you volunteer an address for the seed list, that address goes into the software; nothing else about you does.
Risk, stated plainly
None of this turns a node into a privacy product. Opening a port invites unsolicited traffic from the whole internet, including scanners that have never heard of BigCoin. Tor costs latency and depends on the Tor network being up, and it does not hide from your ISP that you are using Tor. Running a reachable node means peers learn either your address or your onion, and the seed node and this explorer are run by the same person, so connections to those are visible to me. This is a young chain, so if yours is one of the first reachable nodes, that is visible too. Decide with all of that in front of you.
BIG has no promised value. Nothing is for sale. The only way to get it is to mine it.